In this paper, we study turn-based multiplayer quantitative non zero-sum games played on finite graphs with reachability objectives. In this framework each player aims at reaching his own goal as soon as possible. We focus on existence results for two solution concepts: Nash equilibrium and secure equilibrium. We prove the existence of finite-memory Nash (resp. secure) equilibria in n-player (resp. 2-player) games. For the case of Nash equilibria, we extend our result in two directions. First, we show that finite-memory Nash equilibria still exist when the model is enriched by allowing n-tuples of positive costs on edges (one cost by player). Secondly, we prove the existence of Nash equilibria in quantitative games with both reachability and safety objectives.
has proved its efficiency when applied to systems that can be accurately modeled as a finite-state automaton. In contrast, the application of these techniques to computer software, complex systems like embedded systems or distributed systems has been less successful. This could be partly explained by the following reasons: classical automata-based models do not faithfully capture the complex interactive behavior of modern computational systems that are usually composed of several interacting components, also interacting with an environment that is only partially under control. Recent research works show that it is suitable to generalize automata models used in the classical approach to verification, with the more flexible and mathematically deeper game-theoretic framework [16, 17] .
Game Theory Meets Automata Theory The basic framework that extends computational models with concepts from game theory is the so-called two-player zero-sum games played on graphs [10] . Many problems in verification and design of reactive systems can be modeled with this approach, like modeling controller-environment interactions. Given a model of a system interacting with a hostile environment, given a control objective (like preventing the system to reach some bad configurations), the controller synthesis problem asks to build a controller ensuring that the control objective is enforced whatever the environment will do. Two-player zero-sum games played on graphs are adequate models to solve this problem [18] . Moves of Player 1 model actions of the controller whereas moves of Player 2 model the uncontrollable actions of the environment, and a winning strategy for Player 1 is an abstract form of a control program that enforces the control objective.
The controller synthesis problem is suitable to model purely antagonist interactions between a controller and a hostile environment. However in order to study more complex systems with more than two components whose objectives are not necessarily antagonist, we need multiplayer and non zero-sum games to model them adequately. Moreover, we do not look for winning strategies, but rather try to find relevant notions of equilibria, for instance the famous notion of Nash equilibria [16] . On the other hand, only qualitative objectives have been considered so far to specify, for example, that a player must be able to reach a target set of states in the underlying game graph. But, in line with the previous point, we also want to express and solve games for quantitative objectives such as forcing the game to reach a particular set of states within a given time bound, or within a given energy consumption limit. In summary, we need to study equilibria for multiplayer non zero-sum games played on graphs with quantitative objectives. This article provides some new results in this research direction.
Related Work Several recent papers have studied two-player zero-sum games played on finite graphs with regular objectives enriched by some quantitative aspects. Let us mention some of them: games with finitary objectives [7] , games with prioritized requirements [1] , request-response games where the waiting times between the requests and the responses are minimized [13, 19] , and games whose winning conditions are expressed via quantitative languages [2] .
Other works concern qualitative non zero-sum games. The notion of secure equilibrium, an interesting refinement of Nash equilibrium, has been introduced in [6] . It has been proved that a unique secure equilibrium always exists for two-player non zero-sum games with regular objectives. In [11] , general criteria ensuring existence of Nash equilibria, subgame perfect equilibria (resp. secure equilibria) are provided for n-player (resp. 2-player) games, as well as complexity results.
Finally, we mention reference [3] that combines both quantitative and non zerosum aspects. It is maybe the nearest related work compared to us, however the framework and the objectives are pretty different. In [3] , the authors study games played on graphs with terminal vertices where quantitative payoffs are assigned to the players. These games may have cycles but all the infinite plays form a single outcome (like in chess where every infinite play is a draw). That paper gives criteria that ensure the existence of Nash (and subgame perfect) equilibria in pure and memoryless strategies.
Our Contribution We here study turn-based multiplayer quantitative non zero-sum games played on finite graphs with reachability objectives. In this framework each player aims at reaching his own goal as soon as possible. We focus on existence results for two solution concepts: Nash equilibrium and secure equilibrium. We prove the existence of finite-memory Nash (resp. secure) equilibria in n-player (resp. 2player) games. Moreover, we prove that given a Nash (resp. secure) equilibrium of a n-player (resp. 2-player) game, we can build a finite-memory Nash (resp. secure) equilibrium of the same type, i.e. preserving the set of players achieving their objectives. For the case of Nash equilibria, we extend our results in two directions. First we prove that finite-memory Nash equilibria still exist when the model is enriched by allowing n-tuples of positive costs on edges (one cost by player). This result provides an answer to a question we posed in [4] . Secondly, we prove the existence of Nash equilibria in quantitative games where both safety and reachability objectives coexist.
Our results are not a direct consequence of the existing results in the qualitative framework, they require some new proof techniques. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first general result about the existence of equilibria in multiplayer quantitative games played on graphs.
Organization of the Paper Section 2 is dedicated to definitions. We present the games and the equilibria we study. In Sect. 3 we first prove an existence result for Nash equilibria and provide the finite-memory characterization. Similar results concerning secure equilibria in two-player games are established in Sect. 4 
.
A part of these results has been published in [4] , namely the existence of finitememory Nash (resp. secure) equilibria in multiplayer (resp. 2-player) games, and the fact that given a Nash equilibrium we can build a finite-memory Nash equilibrium of the same type. Additionally in this paper we give proofs of the previous results and we extend our existence result for Nash equilibria in the two directions mentioned above, namely (i) n-tuples of positive costs on edges and (ii) reachability/safety objectives. Moreover, in the two-player case, we prove that given a secure equilibrium, we can build a finite-memory secure equilibrium of the same type.
Preliminaries

Definitions
We consider here quantitative games played on a graph where all the players have reachability 1 objectives. It means that, given a certain set of vertices Goal i , each player i wants to reach one of these vertices as soon as possible.
This section is mainly inspired by reference [11] .
We assume that each vertex has at least one outgoing edge. The game is played as follows. A token is first placed on an initial vertex v 0 . Player i, such that v 0 ∈ V i , has to choose one of the outgoing edges of v 0 and put the token on the vertex v 1 reached when following this edge. Then, it is the turn of the player who owns v 1 . And so on.
A play ρ ∈ V ω (resp. a history h ∈ V * ) of G is an infinite (resp. a finite) path through the graph G. The empty history is written . The set H ⊆ V * is made up of all the histories of G. For i ∈ Π , we denote by H i the set of non-empty histories ending in a vertex of V i . A prefix (resp. proper prefix) p of a history h = h 0 · · · h k (h i ∈ V for i = 0, . . . , k) is a finite sequence h 0 · · · h l , with l ≤ k (resp. l < k), denoted by p ≤ h (resp. p < h). We similarly consider a prefix p of a play ρ, denoted by p < ρ.
Sometimes, it is useful to fix an initial vertex v 0 ∈ V for a game G. We then call the pair (G, v 0 ) an initialized game. A history (resp. a play) of (G, v 0 ) is a history (resp. a play) of G starting in v 0 .
We say that a play ρ = ρ 0 ρ 1 · · · visits a set S ⊆ V (resp. a vertex v ∈ V ) if there exists l ∈ N such that ρ l is in S (resp. ρ l = v). The same terminology also stands for a history h. Similarly, we say that ρ visits S after (resp. in) a prefix ρ 0 · · · ρ k if there exists l > k (resp. l ≤ k) such that ρ l is in S. For any play ρ we denote by Visit(ρ) the set of players i ∈ Π such that ρ visits Goal i . The set Visit(h) for a history h is defined similarly. The function Last returns, given a non-empty history h = h 0 · · · h k , the last vertex h k of h, and the length |h| of h is the number k of its edges. 2 For any play ρ = ρ 0 ρ 1 · · · of G, we note Cost i (ρ) the cost of player i, defined by:
We note Cost(ρ) = (Cost i (ρ)) i∈Π the cost profile for the play ρ. The aim of each player i is to minimize the cost he has to pay, i.e. reach his goal set Goal i as soon as possible.
A strategy of player i in G is a function σ : H i → V assigning to each history hv ending in a vertex v of player i, a next vertex σ (hv) such that (v, σ (hv)) belongs to E. We say that a play ρ = ρ 0 ρ 1 · · · of G is consistent with a strategy σ of player i if ρ k+1 = σ (ρ 0 · · · ρ k ) for all k ∈ N such that ρ k ∈ V i . The same terminology is used for a history h of G. A strategy profile of G is a tuple (σ i ) i∈Π where σ i is a strategy for player i. Given an initial vertex v 0 , a strategy profile determines a unique play of (G, v 0 ) consistent with each strategy σ i , called the outcome of (σ i ) i∈Π and denoted by (σ i ) i∈Π v 0 .
A strategy σ of player i is memoryless if σ depends only on the current vertex, i.e. σ (hv) = σ (v) for all hv ∈ H i . More generally, σ is a finite-memory strategy if the equivalence relation ≈ σ on H , defined by h ≈ σ h if Last(h) = Last(h ) and σ (hδ) = σ (h δ) for all histories hδ, h δ ∈ H i , has finite index. In other words, a finitememory strategy is a strategy that can be implemented by a finite automaton with output. A strategy profile (σ i ) i∈Π is called memoryless or finite-memory if each σ i is a memoryless or a finite-memory strategy, respectively.
For a strategy profile (σ i ) i∈Π with outcome ρ and a strategy σ j of player j (j ∈ Π ), we say that player j deviates from ρ after a prefix h of ρ if there exists a prefix h of ρ such that h ≤ h , h is consistent with σ j and σ j (h ) = σ j (h ). We also say that player j deviates from ρ just after a prefix h of ρ if h is consistent with σ j and σ j (h) = σ j (h).
We now introduce the notion of Nash equilibrium and secure equilibrium.
Definition 2
Given a game (G, v 0 ), a strategy profile (σ i ) i∈Π of G is a Nash equilibrium of (G, v 0 ) if for all player j ∈ Π and for all strategy σ j of player j , we have:
This definition means that player j (for all j ∈ Π ) has no incentive to deviate since he increases his cost when using σ j instead of σ j . Keeping notations of Definition 2 in mind, a strategy σ j such that Cost j (ρ) > Cost j (ρ ) is called a profitable deviation for player j with respect to (σ i ) i∈Π . In this case either player j pays an infinite cost for ρ and a finite cost for ρ (ρ visits Goal j , but ρ does not), or player j pays a finite cost for ρ and a strictly lower cost for ρ (ρ visits Goal j earlier than ρ does).
As our results on secure equilibria stand for two-player games, we define this notion only in this context. In order to define the concept of secure equilibrium 3 we first need to associate two appropriate binary relations ≺ 1 and ≺ 2 on cost profiles with player 1 and 2 respectively. Given two cost profiles (x 1 , x 2 ) and (y 1 , y 2 ):
We then say that player 1 prefers (y 1 , y 2 ) to (x 1 , x 2 ). In other words, player 1 prefers a cost profile to another either if he can decrease his own cost, or if he can increase the cost of player 2, while keeping his own cost. We define the relation ≺ 2 symmetrically.
Given two cost profiles (x 1 , x 2 ) and (y 1 , y 2 ), we let:
Then, the definition of secure equilibrium is the following.
Definition 3
Given a two-player game (G, v 0 ), a strategy profile (σ 1 , σ 2 ) of G is a secure equilibrium of (G, v 0 ) iff for all strategies σ 1 of player 1 in G, we have:
where ρ = σ 1 , σ 2 v 0 and ρ = σ 1 , σ 2 v 0 , and symmetrically for all strategies σ 2 of player 2.
This means that player 1 (resp. 2) has no incentive to deviate, with respect to the relation 1 (resp. 2 ). Note that any secure equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium.
In other words, a strategy profile (σ 1 , σ 2 ) of G is a secure equilibrium of (G, v 0 ) if there does not exist any strategy σ 1 of player 1 such that:
where ρ = σ 1 , σ 2 v 0 and ρ = σ 1 , σ 2 v 0 , and symmetrically for player 2.
A strategy σ j such that Cost(ρ) ≺ j Cost(ρ ) is called a ≺ j -profitable deviation for player j with respect to (σ 1 , σ 2 ) (for j ∈ {1, 2}).
Let us go back to the multiplayer framework and define the notion of type of an equilibrium.
Definition 4
The type of a strategy profile (σ i ) i∈Π in a quantitative reachability game (G, v 0 ) is the set of players j ∈ Π such that the outcome ρ of (σ i ) i∈Π visits Goal j . It is denoted by Type((σ i ) i∈Π ).
In other words, Type((σ i ) i∈Π ) = Visit(ρ). The previous definitions are illustrated in the following example.
) be the two-player quantitative reachability game depicted in Fig. 1 , where V 1 = {A, C, D} and V 2 = {B}, Goal 1 = {C} and Goal 2 = {D}, and the initial vertex is vertex A. The vertices controlled by player 1 (resp. 2) are represented by circles (resp. squares) 4 in Fig. 1 .
An example of play in (G, A) is given by ρ = (AD) ω , which visits Goal 2 but not Goal 1 , leading to the cost profile Cost((AD) ω ) = (+∞, 1). The play ρ is, Let us show that the strategy profile (σ 1 , σ 2 ) is not a Nash equilibrium in (G, A), by proving that player 1 has a profitable deviation σ 1 in which he manages to decrease his own cost. With σ 1 defined by σ 1 (hA) = B for all histories hA, we get the play σ 1 , σ 2 A = (ABC) ω such that Cost((ABC) ω ) = (2, +∞), and in particular
On the opposite side, one can show that (σ 1 , σ 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium in (G, A). However (σ 1 , σ 2 ) is not a secure equilibrium this game. Indeed, player 2 has a ≺ 2profitable deviation in which he can increase player 1's cost without modifying his own cost. With σ 2 the strategy of player 2 defined by σ 2 (hB) = A for all histories hB, we get the play σ 1 , σ 2 A = (AB) ω such that Cost((AB) ω ) = (+∞, +∞),
Notice that all strategies discussed so far are memoryless. In order to obtain a Nash equilibrium of type {1, 2} in (G, A), finite-memory strategies are necessary. We define the following finite-memory strategy profile (τ 1 , τ 2 ):
for all histories hA and h B. The outcome π = τ 1 , τ 2 A is equal to AD(ABC) ω and has costs (4, 1). In order to prove that (τ 1 , τ 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium in (G, A), we prove that no player has a profitable deviation. For player 2 it is clearly impossible to get a cost less than 1. To try to get a cost less than 4, player 1 must use a strategy τ 1 such that τ 1 (A) = B. But then player 2 chooses τ 2 (AB) = A. The prefix ABA of the outcome of (τ 1 , τ 2 ) shows that player 1 will increase his cost of 4. However (τ 1 , τ 2 ) is not a secure equilibrium in (G, A) since player 2 has a ≺ 2profitable deviation τ 2 such that τ 2 (hB) = A for all histories hB. One can show that there is no secure equilibrium of type {1, 2} in (G, A).
The questions studied in this article are the following ones: Problem 1 Does there exist a Nash equilibrium (resp. a secure equilibrium) in every initialized multiplayer (resp. two-player) quantitative reachability game? Problem 2 Given a Nash equilibrium (resp. a secure equilibrium) in an initialized multiplayer (resp. two-player) quantitative reachability game, does there exist a finite-memory Nash equilibrium (resp. secure equilibrium) with the same type?
We provide positive answers in Sects. 3 and 4. Notice that these problems have been investigated in the qualitative framework (see [11] ).
Unraveling
In the proofs of this article we need to unravel the graph G = (V , E) of a game G from an initial vertex v 0 , which ends up in an infinite tree, denoted by T . This tree can be seen as a new graph where the set of vertices is the set of histories of (G, v 0 ), the initial vertex is v 0 , and a pair (hv, hvv )
We denote by T the corresponding game played on the unraveling T of G. This game T is equivalent to the game G that is played on G in the following sense. A play (ρ 0 )(ρ 0 ρ 1 )(ρ 0 ρ 1 ρ 2 ) · · · in T induces a unique play ρ = ρ 0 ρ 1 ρ 2 · · · in (G, v 0 ), and conversely. Thus, we denote a play in T by the respective play in G. The bijection between plays of (G, v 0 ) and plays of T allows us to use the same cost function Cost, and to transform easily strategies in (G, v 0 ) to strategies in T (and conversely).
We also need to study the tree T limited to a certain depth d ∈ N: we denote by Trunc d (T ) the truncated tree of T of depth d, and Trunc d (T ) the finite game played on Trunc d (T ). More precisely, the set of vertices of Trunc d (T ) is the set of histories of (G, v 0 ) of length ≤ d; the edges of Trunc d (T ) are defined in the same way as for T except that for the histories h of length d, there exists no edge (h, hv). A play ρ in Trunc d (T ) corresponds to a history of (G, v 0 ) of length equal to d. The notions of cost and strategy are defined exactly like in the game T , but limited to the depth d. For instance, a player pays an infinite cost for a play ρ (of length d) if his goal set is not visited by ρ.
Notice that we always assume that a tree is initialized at its root.
Two-Player Zero-Sum Qualitative Reachability Games
In this section we recall well-known properties of two-player zero-sum qualitative reachability games [10, Chap. 2] . This will be necessary in our proofs.
Definition 6 A two-player zero-sum qualitative reachability game is a tuple
is the set of vertices controlled by player 1 (resp. player 2),
• Goal ⊆ V is the goal set of player 1.
The notions of play, history and strategy are the same as the ones defined in Sect. 2.1. Player 1 (resp. player 2) wins a play ρ of G if ρ visits Goal (resp. ρ does not visit Goal). The game is said zero-sum because every play is won by exactly one of the two players.
In zero-sum games, it is interesting to know if one of the players can play in such a way that he is sure to win, however the other player plays. One can formalize this with the notion of winning strategy. A strategy σ i for player i is a winning strategy in a game G from an initial vertex v if all plays of G starting in v that are consistent with σ i are won by player i. If player i has a winning strategy in G from v, we say that player i wins the game G from v. We say that a game G is determined if for all v ∈ V , one of the two players has a winning strategy from v.
Martin showed [15] that every two-player zero-sum qualitative game with a Borel type winning condition is determined. In particular, we have the following proposition. Goal) be a two-player zero-sum qualitative reachability game. Then for all v ∈ V , one of the two players has a memoryless winning strategy from v (in particular, G is determined).
Moreover for all vertices v from which he wins the game, player 1 (resp. player 2) has a memoryless strategy that is independent of v and that forces the play to visit Goal within at most |V | − 1 edges (resp. to stay in V \ Goal).
Qualitative Games vs Quantitative Games
We show in this section that Problems 1 and 2 can not be reduced to problems on qualitative games in the following sense. Existence of Nash equilibria in qualitative nonzero-sum games where each player has a reachability objective (proved in [8] ) does not directly imply existence of Nash equilibria in quantitative reachability games.
Given a multiplayer quantitative reachability game G, one can naturally define a qualitative version of G, denoted by G, such that the payoffs 6 are qualitative. Given a play ρ of G, the qualitative payoff of player i is defined by:
We note Payoff(ρ) = (Payoff i (ρ)) i∈Π the qualitative payoff profile for the play ρ. In this framework, player i aims at reaching his own goal set, i.e. at obtaining payoff Win. With this idea in mind, one can naturally adapt the notion of Nash (resp. secure) equilibrium to the qualitative framework.
The existence of Nash (resp. secure) equilibria in n-player (resp. 2-player) qualitative games has been proved in [8] (resp. [6] ) for reachability objectives, and more generally for Borel objectives. The next example illustrates that a Nash equilibrium in (G, v 0 ) is not necessarily a Nash equilibrium in (G, v 0 ). That is why we have developed new ideas in Sects. 3 and 4 to solve Problem 1.
Example 8
Let us now consider the two-player quantitative reachability game G depicted in Fig. 2 , such that Goal 1 = {B, E} and Goal 2 = {C}. Notice that only player 1 effectively plays in this game. We are going to exhibit a secure (and thus Nash) equilibrium (σ 1 , σ 2 ) in the qualitative game (G, A) that can not be lifted neither to a secure nor to a Nash equilibrium in the quantitative game (G, A). The strategy
is not a Nash (and thus not a secure) equilibrium in (G, A). Indeed, the play ABC ω provides a smaller cost to player 1, i.e. Cost 1 (ABC ω ) < Cost 1 (ADE ω ). Notice that in this example, there is no equilibrium in (G, A) of type {1}.
The next proposition shows that on the opposite side, any Nash equilibrium in a quantitative game G can be lifted to a Nash equilibrium in the qualitative game G. Proposition 9 Any Nash equilibrium in a multiplayer quantitative reachability game (G, v 0 ) is also a Nash equilibrium in the corresponding qualitative game (G, v 0 ).
Proof Let (σ i ) i∈Π be a Nash equilibrium in a multiplayer quantitative reachability game (G, v 0 ). For a contradiction, let us assume that in (G, v 0 ), player j has a profitable deviation σ j w.
Thus when playing σ j against (σ i ) i∈Π\{j } , player j manages to visit Goal j . Clearly enough, σ j would also be a profitable deviation w.r.t. (σ i ) i∈Π in (G, v 0 ), contradicting the hypothesis.
Note that Proposition 9 is false for secure equilibria. To see that, let us come back to the game G of Fig. 2 . The strategy profile (σ 1 , σ 2 ) such that σ 1 , σ 2 A = ABC ω is a secure equilibrium in the quantitative game (G, A) but not in the corresponding qualitative game (G, A).
Nash Equilibria
From now on we will often use the term game to denote a multiplayer quantitative reachability game according to Definition 1.
Existence of a Finite-Memory Nash Equilibrium
In this section we positively solve Problem 1 for Nash equilibria.
Theorem 10
In every initialized multiplayer quantitative reachability game, there exists a finite-memory Nash equilibrium.
The proof of this theorem is based on the following ideas. Kuhn's theorem (see Theorem 11 below) implies that there exists a Nash equilibrium in the game Trunc d (T ) played on the finite tree Trunc d (T ), for any depth d. By choosing an adequate depth d, Proposition 13 enables to extend this Nash equilibrium to a Nash equilibrium in the infinite tree T , and thus in G. Let us detail these ideas.
We first recall Kuhn's theorem [14] . A preference relation is a total reflexive transitive binary relation.
Theorem 11 (Kuhn's theorem) Let Γ be a finite tree and G Γ a game played on Γ . For each player i ∈ Π , let i be a preference relation on cost profiles. Then there exists a strategy profile (σ i ) i∈Π such that for every player j ∈ Π and every strategy σ j of player j in G Γ we have
Note that Cost(ρ ) j Cost(ρ) means that player j prefers the cost profile of the play ρ than the one of ρ , or they are equivalent for him.
Then there exists a Nash equilibrium in Trunc d (T ).
Proof For each player j ∈ Π , we define the relation j on cost profiles in the following way: let (x i ) i∈Π and (y i ) i∈Π be two cost profiles, we say that (x i ) i∈Π j (y i ) i∈Π iff x j ≥ y j . It is clearly a preference relation which captures the Nash equilibrium. The strategy profile (σ i ) i∈Π of Kuhn's theorem is then a Nash equilibrium in Trunc d (T ).
Proposition 13 states that it is possible to extend a Nash equilibrium in Trunc d (T ) to a Nash equilibrium in the game T , if the depth d is equal to (|Π| + 1) · 2 · |V |. We obtain Theorem 10 as a consequence of Corollary 12 and Proposition 13.
Proposition 13
Let (G, v 0 ) be a game and T be the unraveling of G from v 0 . Let Trunc d (T ) be the game played on the truncated tree of T of depth d = (|Π| + 1) · 2 · |V |. If there exists a Nash equilibrium in the game Trunc d (T ), then there exists a finite-memory Nash equilibrium in the game T .
The proof of Proposition 13 roughly works as follows. Let (σ i ) i∈Π be a Nash equilibrium in Trunc d (T ). A well-chosen prefix αβ, with β being a cycle, is first extracted from the outcome ρ of (σ i ) i∈Π . The outcome of the required Nash equilibrium (τ i ) i∈Π in T will be equal to αβ ω . As soon as a player deviates from this play, all the other players form a coalition to punish him in a way that this deviation is not profitable for him. These ideas are detailed in Lemmas 15 and 16. One can see Lemma 15 as a technical result used to prove Lemma 16, which is the main ingredient to show Proposition 13. The proof of Lemma 15 relies on a particular case (stated below) of Proposition 7. More precisely, we consider the qualitative two-player zerosum game G j played on the graph G, where player j plays in order to reach his goal set Goal j , against the coalition of all other players that wants to prevent him from reaching his goal set. Player j plays on the vertices from V j and the coalition on V \ V j .
be the qualitative twoplayer zero-sum reachability game associated to player j . Then player j has a memoryless strategy ν j that enables him to reach Goal j within |V | − 1 edges from each vertex v from which he wins the game G j . On the contrary, the coalition has a memoryless strategy ν −j that forces the play to stay in V \ Goal j from each vertex v from which it wins the game G j .
Lemma 15
Suppose d ∈ N. Let (σ i ) i∈Π be a Nash equilibrium in Trunc d (T ) and ρ the (finite) outcome of (σ i ) i∈Π . Assume that ρ has a prefix αβγ , where β contains at least one vertex, such that
. Then for all histories hu of G (with u ∈ V ) consistent with (σ i ) i∈Π\{j } and such that |hu| ≤ |αβ|, the coalition of the players i = j wins the game G j from u.
Condition Visit(α) = Visit(αβγ ) means that if Goal i is visited by αβγ , it has already been visited by α. Condition Last(α) = Last(αβ) means that β is a cycle. The play ρ of Lemma 15 is illustrated in Fig. 3 .
Lemma 15 says in particular that the players i = j can play together to prevent player j from reaching his goal set Goal j , in case he deviates from the play αβ (as αβ is consistent with (σ i ) i∈Π\{j } ). We denote by ν −j the memoryless winning strategy of the coalition. For each player i = j , let ν i,j be the memoryless strategy of player i in G induced by ν −j .
Proof of Lemma 15
By contradiction suppose that player j wins the game G j from u. By Proposition 14 player j has a memoryless winning strategy ν j which enables him to reach his goal set Goal j within at most |V |−1 edges from u. We show that ν j leads to a profitable deviation for player j w.r.t. (σ i ) i∈Π in the game Trunc d (T ), which is impossible by hypothesis.
Let ρ be a play in Trunc d (T ) such that hu is a prefix of ρ , and from u, player j plays according to the strategy ν j and the other players i = j continue to play according to σ i . As the play ρ is consistent with the memoryless winning strategy ν j from u, it visits Goal j and we have
We consider the following two cases. If Cost j (ρ) = +∞ (i.e. ρ does not visit Goal j ), we have
On the contrary, if Cost j (ρ) < +∞ (i.e. ρ visits Goal j , but after the prefix αβγ by hypothesis), then we have
Since ρ is consistent with (σ i ) i∈Π\{j } , the strategy of player j induced by the play ρ is a profitable deviation for player j w.r.t. (σ i ) i∈Π in both cases, which is a contradiction. Now that we have proved Lemma 15, we use it in order to obtain Lemma 16, which states that one can define a Nash equilibrium (τ i ) i∈Π in the game T , based on the Nash equilibrium (σ i ) i∈Π in the game Trunc d (T ).
and αβγ be a prefix of ρ = (σ i ) i∈Π v 0 as defined in Lemma 15. Then there exists a Nash equilibrium (τ i ) i∈Π in the game T . Moreover (τ i ) i∈Π is finite-memory, and Type((τ i ) i∈Π ) = Visit(α).
Proof Let us set Π = {1, . . . , n}. As α and β end in the same vertex, we can consider the infinite play αβ ω in the game T . Without loss of generality we can order the players i ∈ Π so that
where 0 ≤ k ≤ n. In the second case, notice that ρ could visit Goal i (but after the prefix αβγ ).
The Nash equilibrium (τ i ) i∈Π required by Lemma 16 is intuitively defined as follows. First the outcome of (τ i ) i∈Π is exactly αβ ω . Secondly the first player j who deviates from αβ ω is punished by the coalition of the other players in the following way. If j ≤ k and the deviation occurs in the tree Trunc d (T ), then the coalition plays according to (σ i ) i∈Π\{j } in this tree. It prevents player j from reaching his goal set Goal j faster than in αβ ω . And if j > k, the coalition wins the zero-sum qualitative reachability game G j from the vertex u where player j has deviated from αβ ω (by Lemma 15), then the coalition play according to a memoryless winning strategy (given by Proposition 14) so that player j does not reach his goal set at all. We denote by ν i,j the strategy of player i = j derived from the memoryless winning strategy of the coalition.
We begin by defining a punishment function P on the vertex set H of T such that P (h) indicates the first player j who has deviated from αβ ω , with respect to h. We write P (h) = ⊥ if no deviation has occurred. For v 0 , we define P (v 0 ) = ⊥ and for every history hv (with v ∈ V ) starting in v 0 , we let:
The Nash equilibrium (τ i ) i∈Π is then defined as follows: let h be a history ending in a vertex of V i ,
if P (h) = ⊥, i, P (h) ≤ k and |h| < d, arbitrary otherwise (P (h) = ⊥, i, P (h) ≤ k and |h| ≥ d) (2) where arbitrary means that the next vertex is chosen arbitrarily (in a memoryless way). Clearly the outcome of (τ i ) i∈Π is the play αβ ω , and Type((τ i ) i∈Π ) is equal to Visit(α) (= Visit(αβ)).
It remains to prove that (τ i ) i∈Π is a finite-memory Nash equilibrium in the game T . We first show that the strategy profile (τ i ) i∈Π defined in (2) is a Nash equilibrium in the game T . Let τ j be a strategy of player j . We show that this is not a profitable deviation for player j w.r.t. (τ i ) i∈Π . We distinguish the following two cases:
To improve his cost, player j has no incentive to deviate after the prefix α. Thus we assume that the strategy τ j causes a deviation from a vertex visited in α. By (2) the other players first play according to (σ i ) i∈Π \{j } in Trunc d (T ), and then in an arbitrary way.
Suppose that τ j is a profitable deviation for player j w.r.t. (τ i ) i∈Π in the game T . Let us set π = (τ i ) i∈Π v 0 and π = τ j , (τ i ) i∈Π \{j } v 0 . Then
On the other hand we know that Cost j (π) = Cost j (ρ) ≤ |α|.
So if we limit the play π in T to its prefix of length d, we get a play ρ in Trunc d (T ) such that
As the play ρ is consistent with the strategies (σ i ) i∈Π \{j } by (2), the strategy τ j restricted to the tree Trunc d (T ) is a profitable deviation for player j w.r.t. (σ i ) i∈Π in the game Trunc d (T ). This contradicts the fact that (σ i ) i∈Π is a Nash equilibrium in this game. (ii) j > k (Cost j (αβ ω ) = +∞, αβ ω does not visit Goal j ).
If player j deviates from αβ ω (with the strategy τ j ), by (2) the other players combine against him and play according to ν −j . By Lemma 15 this coalition wins the game G j from any vertex visited by αβ ω . So the strategy ν −j of the coalition keeps the play τ j , (τ i ) i∈Π\{j } v 0 away from the set Goal j , whatever player j does. Therefore τ j is not a profitable deviation for player j w.r.t. (τ i ) i∈Π in the game T .
We now prove that (τ i ) i∈Π is a finite-memory strategy profile. According to the definition of finite-memory strategy (see Sect. 2) we have to prove that each relation ≈ τ i on H has finite index (recall that h ≈ τ i h if τ i (hδ) = τ i (h δ) for all δ ∈ V * V i ). In this aim we define for each player i an equivalence relation ∼ τ i with finite index such that
We first define an equivalence relation ∼ P with finite index related to the punishment function P . For all prefixes h, h of αβ ω , i.e. such that no player is punished, this relation does not distinguish two histories that are identical except for a certain number of cycles β. For the other histories it just has to remember the first player, say i, who has deviated. The definition of ∼ P is as follows:
The relation ∼ P is an equivalence relation on H with finite index.
We now turn to the definition of ∼ τ i . It is based on the definition of τ i (given in (2)) and ∼ P . To get an equivalence with finite index we proceed as follows. Recall that each strategy ν i,P (h) is memo ryless and when a player plays arbitrarily, his strategy is also memoryless. Furthermore notice that, in the definition of τ i , the strategy σ i is only applied to histories h with length |h| < d. For histories h such that τ i (h) = v with hv < αβ ω , it is enough to remember information with respect to αβ as already done for ∼ P . Therefore for h, h ∈ H we define ∼ τ i in the following way: We can now proceed to the proof of Proposition 13.
Proof of Proposition 13
Let us set Π = {1, . . . , n} and d = (n + 1) · 2 · |V |. Let (σ i ) i∈Π be a Nash equilibrium in the game Trunc d (T ) and ρ its outcome.
To be able to use Lemma 16, we consider the prefix pq of ρ of minimal length such that
It means that |q| = 2 · |V | − 1 and no new goal set is visited by q. Let us show that such a prefix pq exists. In the worst case, the play ρ visits the goal set of a new player in each prefix of length i · 2 · |V |, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, i.e. |p| = n · 2 · |V |. But the length d of ρ is equal to (n + 1) · 2 · |V | by hypothesis. As a consequence, such a prefix pq exists. Moreover, the following statements are true.
• l ≤ 2 · n + 1.
• If Visit(p) Visit(ρ), then l < 2 · n + 1.
The first statement results from the fact that |p| ≤ n · 2 · |V | (see above). For the second statement, suppose that there exists i ∈ Visit(ρ) \ Visit(p), then ρ visit Goal i after the prefix pq by (3) . And so, it can not be the case that l = 2 · n + 1.
Given the length of q, one vertex of V is visited at least twice by q. More precisely, we can write In particular, |p| ≤ |α| (see Fig. 3 ). We have Visit(α) = Visit(αβγ ), and |αβγ | = (l + 1) · |V |.
As the hypotheses of Lemma 16 are verified, we can apply it in this context to get a finite-memory Nash equilibrium (τ i ) i∈Π in the game T such that Type((τ i ) i∈Π ) = Visit(α).
Proposition 13 asserts that given a game (G, v 0 ) and the game Trunc d (T ) played on the truncated tree of T of a well-chosen depth d, one can lift any Nash equilibrium (σ i ) i∈Π of Trunc d (T ) to a Nash equilibrium (τ i ) i∈Π in (G, v 0 ). The proof of Proposition 13 states that the type of (τ i ) i∈Π is equal to Visit(α), which might be different from the type of (σ i ) i∈Π . We here give an example that shows that it is in fact impossible to preserve the type of the lifted Nash equilibrium (σ i ) i∈Π .
Example 17 Let us consider the two-player game G depicted in Fig. 4 with Goal 1 = {C}, Goal 2 = {E}. One can show that (G, A) admits only Nash equilibria of type {2} or ∅. Indeed, on one hand, there is no play of G where both goals are visited, and on the other hand given a strategy profile (σ i ) i∈Π such that (σ i ) i∈Π A visits Goal 1 (i.e. (σ i ) i∈Π A is of the form A + BC ω ), playing D instead of C is clearly a profitable deviation for player 2.
We will now see that for each d ≥ 2 the game played on Trunc d (T ) admits a Nash equilibrium of type {1}. From the above discussion, this equilibrium can not be lifted to a Nash equilibrium of the same type in (G, A). A truncated tree Trunc d (T ) is depicted in Fig. 5 . One can show that the strategy profile leading to the outcome A d−1 BC (depicted in bold in the figure) is a Nash equilibrium in Trunc d (T ) of type {1}. Following the lines of the proof of Proposition 13, we see that this Nash equilibrium is lifted to a Nash equilibrium of (G, A) with outcome A ω and type ∅.
On the other hand, notice that from the proof of Proposition 13, we can construct a Nash equilibrium such that each player pays either an infinite cost, or a cost bounded by |Π| · 2 · |V |.
Nash Equilibria with Finite Memory Preserving Types
In this section we show that given a Nash equilibrium, we can construct another Nash equilibrium with the same type such that all its strategies are finite-memory. We then answer to Problem 2 for Nash equilibria.
Theorem 18 Given a Nash equilibrium in an initialized multiplayer quantitative reachability game, there exists a finite-memory Nash equilibrium of the same type.
The proof is based on two steps. The first step constructs from a Nash equilibrium (σ i ) i∈Π another Nash equilibrium (τ i ) i∈Π with the same type such that the play (τ i ) i∈Π v 0 is of the form αβ ω with Visit(α) = Type((σ i ) i∈Π ). This is possible thanks to Lemmas 19 and 20, by first eliminating unnecessary cycles in the play (σ i ) i∈Π v 0 and then locating a prefix αβ such that β is a cycle that can be infinitely repeated.
The second step transforms the Nash equilibrium (τ i ) i∈Π into a finite-memory one thanks to Lemma 16 given in Sect. 3.1. For that purpose, we consider the strategy profile (τ i ) i∈Π limited to the tree T truncated at a well-chosen depth.
The next lemma indicates how to eliminate a cycle in the outcome of a Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 19
Let (σ i ) i∈Π be a strategy profile in a game (G, v 0 ) and let ρ be its outcome. Suppose that ρ = pqρ, where q contains at least one vertex, such that
We define a strategy profile (τ i ) i∈Π as follows:
If a strategy τ j is a profitable deviation for player j w.r.t. (τ i ) i∈Π , then there exists a profitable deviation σ j for player j w.r.t. (σ i ) i∈Π .
Proof Let us set Π = {1, . . . , n}. We write ρ = (σ i ) i∈Π v 0 of cost profile (x 1 , . . . , x n ), π = (τ i ) i∈Π v 0 of cost profile (y 1 , . . . , y n ).
We observe that as ρ = pqρ, we have π = pρ (see Figs. 6 and 7). It follows that
More precisely,
-if x i = +∞, then y i = +∞;
-if x i < +∞ and i ∈ Visit(p), then y i = x i ;
-if x i < +∞ and i ∈ Visit(p), then y i = x i − |q| + 1 .
Let τ j be a profitable deviation for player j w.r.t. (τ i ) i∈Π , and π be the outcome of the strategy profile (τ j , (τ i ) i∈Π\{j } ). Then Cost j π < y j .
We show how to construct a profitable deviation σ j for player j w.r.t. (σ i ) i∈Π . Two cases occur: (i) player j deviates from π just after a proper prefix h of p (like for the play π 1 in Fig. 7 ). We define σ j = τ j and we denote by ρ the outcome of (σ j , (σ i ) i∈Π \{j } ). Given the definition of the strategy profile (τ i ) i∈Π , one can verify that ρ = π (see the play ρ 1 in Fig. 6 ). Thus Cost j ρ = Cost j π < y j ≤ x j by (4), which implies that σ j is a profitable deviation of player j w.r.t. (σ i ) i∈Π . (ii) player j deviates from π after the prefix p (π and π coincide at least on p). This case is illustrated by the play π 2 in Fig. 7 . We define for all histories h ending in a vertex of V j :
Let us set ρ = σ j , (σ i ) i∈Π\{j } v 0 . As player j deviates after p with the strategy τ j , one can prove that π = pπ and ρ = pqπ by definition of (τ i ) i∈Π (see the play ρ 2 in Fig. 6 ). As Cost j (π ) < y j , it means that j ∈ Visit(p) (otherwise the deviation would not be profitable for player j ). Since Visit(p) = Visit(pq), we also have Cost j π + |q| + 1 = Cost j ρ .
By (5) and (6), we get -either x j = y j = +∞ and Cost j (ρ ) < x j , -or x j = y j + (|q| + 1) and Cost j (ρ ) < x j , which proves that σ j is a profitable deviation for player j w.r.t. (σ i ) i∈Π .
While Lemma 19 deals with elimination of unnecessary cycles, Lemma 20 deals with repetition of a useful cycle.
Lemma 20 Let (σ i ) i∈Π be a strategy profile in a game (G, v 0 ) and let ρ be its outcome. We assume that ρ = pqρ, where q contains at least one vertex, such that
Proof We use the same notations as in the proof of Lemma 19. Here we have x i = y i for all i ∈ Π since Visit(p) = Visit(ρ). One can prove that π = pq ω (see Figs. 8 and 9 ).
We show how to define a profitable deviation σ j from the deviation τ j . We distinguish the following two cases:
(i) player j deviates from π just after a proper prefix h of pq.
We define σ j = τ j . As in the first case of the proof of Lemma 19, we have Cost j (ρ ) < x j , which implies that σ j is a profitable deviation of player j w.r.t. (σ i ) i∈Π . (ii) player j deviates from π after the prefix pq, i.e. after a prefix pq k and strictly before the prefix pq k+1 (k ≥ 1). We define for all histories h ending in a vertex of V j :
One can prove that π = pq kπ and ρ = pπ .
And then, in the point of view of costs we have
Cost j ρ < Cost j π < y j = x j , Fig. 8 Play ρ and its prefix pq Proposition 21 Let (σ i ) i∈Π be a Nash equilibrium in a game (G, v 0 ). Then there exists a Nash equilibrium (τ i ) i∈Π with the same type and such that its outcome is of the form αβ ω , where Visit(α) = Type((σ i ) i∈Π ) and |αβ| < (|Π| + 1) · |V |.
Proof Let us set Π = {1, . . . , n} and ρ = (σ i ) i∈Π v 0 . Without loss of generality suppose that Cost(ρ) = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) such that x 1 ≤ · · · ≤ x k < +∞ and x k+1 = · · · = x n = +∞ where 0 ≤ k ≤ n. We consider two cases:
Then, there exists a prefix pq of ρ, with q containing at least one vertex, such that
We define the strategy profile (τ i ) i∈Π as proposed in Lemma 19. By this lemma it is actually a Nash equilibrium in G. With π = (τ i ) i∈Π v 0 , we have ρ = pqρ and π = pρ.
Thus if the cost profile for the play π is (y 1 , . . . , y n ), we have y 1 < x 1 , ..., y k < x k y k+1 = x k+1 = +∞, . . . , y n = x n = +∞.
We define the strategy profile (τ i ) i∈Π given in Lemma 19. It is then a Nash equilibrium in G, and for π = (τ i ) i∈Π v 0 , we have ρ = pqρ and π = pρ.
Hence if the cost profile for the play π is (y 1 , . . . , y n ), we have y 1 = x 1 , ..., y l = x l ; y l+1 < x l+1 , . . . , y k < x k ; y k+1 = x k+1 = +∞, . . . , y n = x n = +∞.
By applying finitely many times the two previous cases, we can assume without loss of generality that (σ i ) i∈Π is a Nash equilibrium with a cost profile (x 1 , . . . , x n ) such that
Let us go further. We can write ρ = αβρ such that
Indeed, the prefix h of ρ of length (k + 1) · |V | visits each goal set Goal i , with i ≤ k, and after the last visited Goal k , there remains enough vertices to observe a cycle. Notice that Visit(α) = Visit(αβ) = Visit(ρ) (= Type((σ i ) i∈Π )). If we define the strategy profile (τ i ) i∈Π like in Lemma 20, we get a Nash equilibrium in (G, v 0 ) with outcome αβ ω and the same type as (σ i ) i∈Π .
We are now ready to prove Theorem 18. (G, v 0 ) be a multiplayer quantitative reachability game. Let us set Π = {1, . . . , n}. Let (σ i ) i∈Π be a Nash equilibrium in the game (G, v 0 ) . The first step consists in constructing a Nash equilibrium as in Proposition 21. Let us denote it again by (σ i ) i∈Π . Let us set ρ = (σ i ) i∈Π v 0 = αβ ω such that Visit(α) = Type((σ i ) i∈Π ) and |αβ| < (n + 1) · |V |. The strategy profile (σ i ) i∈Π is also a Nash equilibrium in the game T played on the unraveling T of G.
Proof of Theorem 18 Let
For the second step we consider Trunc d (T ) the truncated tree of T of depth d = (n + 2) · |V |. It is clear that the strategy profile (σ i ) i∈Π limited to this tree is also a Nash equilibrium of Trunc d (T ).
We know that |αβ| < (n + 1) · |V | and we set γ such that αβγ is a prefix of ρ and |αβγ | = (n + 2) · |V |. Furthermore we have Last(α) = Last(αβ) and Visit(α) = Visit(αβγ ) (since Visit(α) = Type(ρ)). Then this prefix αβγ satisfies the properties described in Lemma 15 (by setting l = n + 1). By Lemma 16 we conclude that there exists a Nash equilibrium (τ i ) i∈Π with finite memory such that Type((τ i ) i∈Π ) = Visit(α), that is, with the same type as the initial Nash equilibrium (σ i ) i∈Π .
Extensions of the Model
In this section, we extend Theorem 10 to games with slightly more general quantitative objectives.
Multiplayer Quantitative Reachability/Safety Games
Let us now consider quantitative games played on a graph where some players have reachability objectives, whereas others have safety objectives. As previously, the players with reachability objectives want to reach their goal set as soon as possible. The players with safety objectives want to avoid their bad set or, if impossible, delay its visit as long as possible. Let us make that precise through the following definition.
Definition 22 A multiplayer quantitative reachability/safety game is a tuple G = (Π, Π r , Π s , V , (V i ) i∈Π , E, (Goal i ) i∈Π r , (Bad i ) i∈Π s ) where
• Π is a finite set of players partitioned into Π r and Π s which are the players with reachability and safety objectives respectively,
is the set of edges, • (V i ) i∈Π is a partition of V such that V i is the set of vertices controlled by player i,
For any play ρ = ρ 0 ρ 1 · · · of G, we denote by Cost i (ρ) the cost of player i. For i ∈ Π r , the cost is defined as before, and for i ∈ Π s , the cost is defined by:
As before, the aim of each player i is to minimize his cost, i.e. reach his goal set Goal i as soon as possible for i ∈ Π r , or delay the visit of Bad i as long as possible for i ∈ Π s . The notions of play, strategy, outcome and Nash equilibrium extend in a natural way. The main result of this section is the following theorem which solves Problem 1 in this framework.
Theorem 23
In every initialized multiplayer quantitative reachability/safety game, there exists a finite-memory Nash equilibrium.
In order to prove Theorem 23, we have to review the results of Sect. 3.1. In the context of quantitative reachability/safety games, the notation Visit(ρ) refers to the set of players i ∈ Π r and j ∈ Π s such that ρ visits Goal i and Bad j . Let us first notice that Lemma 15 remains true in this framework when player j belongs to Π r . As a reminder, this lemma roughly says that, given a Nash equilibrium in Trunc d (T ), if its outcome has a prefix that fulfils some conditions, then the coalition of the players i = j wins the game G j from any vertex of this prefix.
Furthermore, Lemma 16 remains true, however we have to slightly adapt its proof. Let us remind this lemma and prove it again in the current context.
Lemma 24
Let G = (Π, Π r , Π s , V , (V i ) i∈Π , E, (Goal i ) i∈Π r , (Bad i ) i∈Π s ) be a multiplayer quantitative reachability/safety game, and T be the corresponding game played on the unraveling of G from a vertex v 0 . For any depth d ∈ N, let (σ i ) i∈Π be a Nash equilibrium in Trunc d (T ), and ρ the (finite) outcome of (σ i ) i∈Π . Assume that ρ has a prefix αβγ , where β contains at least one vertex, such that
Then there exists a Nash equilibrium (τ i ) i∈Π in the game T . Moreover, (τ i ) i∈Π is finite-memory, and Type((τ i ) i∈Π ) = Visit(α).
Proof As in the proof of Lemma 16, we denote by ν i,j the memoryless strategy of player i = j derived from the memoryless winning strategy of the coalition Π \ {j } given by Lemma 15 (when its hypotheses are satisfied) and Proposition 14.
Moreover, we denote by Π f r (resp. Π f s ) the subset of players i ∈ Π r (resp. i ∈ Π s ) such that α visits Goal i (resp. Bad i ) and by Π ∞ r (resp. Π ∞ s ) the set Π r \ Π f r (resp. Π s \ Π f s ).
The punishment function P is defined exactly as in the proof of Lemma 16. For v 0 , we define P (v 0 ) = ⊥ and for every history h such that Last(h) ∈ V i and v ∈ V , we let:
if P (h) = ⊥ and hv < αβ ω , i if P (h) = ⊥ and hv < αβ ω , P (h) otherwise (P (h) = ⊥).
The difference with the proof of Lemma 16 arises in the definition of the Nash equilibrium (τ i ) i∈Π . The new equilibrium needs to incorporate an adequate punishment for the players with safety objectives. More precisely, in order to dissuade a player j ∈ Π f s from deviating, the other players punish him by playing the strategies (σ i ) i∈Π\{j } in Trunc d (T ). Notice that a player j ∈ Π ∞ s has no incentive to deviate. Formally we define the Nash equilibrium (τ i ) i∈Π as follows.
where arbitrary means that the next vertex is chosen arbitrarily (in a memoryless way). Clearly the outcome of (τ i ) i∈Π is the play αβ ω , and Type((τ i ) i∈Π ) is equal to Visit(α) (= Visit(αβ)).
It remains to prove that (τ i ) i∈Π is a finite-memory Nash equilibrium in the game T . In order to do so, we prove that none of the players has a profitable deviation. For players with reachability objectives, the arguments are exactly the same as the ones provided in the proof of Lemma 16. Let us now consider players with safety objectives. In the case where j ∈ Π ∞ s , player j has clearly no incentive to deviate. In the case where j ∈ Π f s , to decrease his cost, player j has no incentive to deviate after the prefix α. Thus we assume that the strategy τ j causes a deviation from a vertex visited in α. By (7) the other players first play according to (σ i ) i∈Π \{j } in Trunc d (T ), and then in an arbitrary way.
Suppose that τ j is a profitable deviation for player j w.r.t. (τ i ) i∈Π in the game T . Let us set π = (τ i ) i∈Π v 0 and π = τ j , (τ i ) i∈Π\{j } v 0 . Then
Notice that we do not necessarily have that Cost j (ρ ) = Cost j (π ) (as in the proof of Lemma 16) since the bad set Bad j can be visited by π and not by ρ . As the play ρ is consistent with the strategies (σ i ) i∈Π\{j } by (7) , the strategy τ j restricted to the tree Trunc d (T ) is a profitable deviation for player j w.r.t. (σ i ) i∈Π in the game Trunc d (T ). This is impossible. Moreover, as done in the proof of Lemma 16, (τ 1 , τ 2 ) is a finite-memory strategy profile.
Since Lemma 16 holds in the context of reachability/safety objectives, Proposition 13 ensures that the equilibrium in Trunc d (T ) provided by Kuhn's theorem (Corollary 12) can be lifted to T . This proves Theorem 23.
Multiplayer Quantitative Reachability Games with Tuples of Costs on Edges
In this section, we come back to a pure reachability framework and we extend our model in the following way: we assume that edges are labeled with tuples of positive costs (one cost for each player). Here we do not only count the number of edges to reach the goal of a player, but we sum up his costs along the path until his goal is reached. His aim is still to minimize his global cost for a play. We generalize Definition 1, and extend Theorem 10 to these games.
Definition 25 An multiplayer quantitative reachability game with tuples of costs on edges is a tuple
is the set of edges, • (V i ) i∈Π is a partition of V such that V i is the set of vertices controlled by player i, • Cost i : E → R >0 is the cost function of player i defined on the edges of the graph, • Goal i ⊆ V is the goal set of player i.
In such a game, the cost of player i for a play ρ = ρ 0 ρ 1 · · · is defined as
We also positively solve Problem 1 for Nash equilibria in this context.
Theorem 26
In every initialized multiplayer quantitative reachability game with tuples of costs on edges, there exists a finite-memory Nash equilibrium.
To prove Theorem 26, we follow the same scheme as in Sect. 3.1. In particular, we rely on Kuhn's theorem (Corollary 12) and need to prove a counterpart of Lemma 15, Lemma 16 and Proposition 13 in this framework.
Let us first introduce some notations that will be useful in this context. We define c min := min i∈Π min e∈E Cost i (e), c max := max i∈Π max e∈E Cost i (e) and K := c max c min . It is clear that c min , c max > 0 and K ≥ 1.
The counterpart of Lemma 15 is the following one, taking into account the constant K defined before.
Lemma 27
Suppose d ∈ N. Let (σ i ) i∈Π be a Nash equilibrium in Trunc d (T ) and ρ the outcome of (σ i ) i∈Π . Assume that ρ has a prefix αβγ , where β contains at least one vertex, such that
Let j ∈ Π be such that α does not visit Goal j . Consider the qualitative two-player zero-sum game G j = (V , (V j , V \ V j ), E, Goal j ). Then for all histories hu of G (with u ∈ V ) consistent with (σ i ) i∈Π\{j } and such that hu ≤ αβ, the coalition of the players i = j wins the game G j from u.
Sketch As for the proof of Lemma 15 we proceed by contradiction and define a play ρ in the very same way. We can deduce that Index j ρ ≤ |hu| + |V | (by Proposition 14)
The case where Cost j (ρ) = +∞ is solved in the same way. For the other case Cost j (ρ) < +∞, we note c j (hu) the sum of the costs of player j along the prefix hu. We have the following inequalities (see Fig. 10 ):
Then we have Cost j (ρ ) < Cost j (ρ), and since the play ρ is consistent with (σ i ) i∈Π\{j } , the strategy of player j induced by the play ρ is a profitable deviation for player j w.r.t. (σ i ) i∈Π . This contradicts the fact that (σ i ) i∈Π is a Nash equilibrium in the game Trunc d (T ).
The following lemma is the counterpart of Lemma 16.
Lemma 28 Suppose d ∈ N. Let (σ i ) i∈Π be a Nash equilibrium in Trunc d (T ) and αβγ be a prefix of ρ = (σ i ) i∈Π v 0 as defined in Lemma 27 where |αβγ | = (l + K) · |V | for some l ∈ N 0 such that l ≤ d |V |·K + 1. Then there exists a Nash equilibrium (τ i ) i∈Π in the game T . Moreover (τ i ) i∈Π is finite-memory, and Type((τ i ) i∈Π ) = Visit(α).
Proof We prove this result in the very same way as Lemma 16. The only difference lies in the case 7 j ≤ k when we show that (τ i ) i∈Π is a Nash equilibrium. We suppose that τ j is a profitable deviation for player j w.r.t. (τ i ) i∈Π in the game T . So we have Cost j (π ) < Cost j (π), where π = (τ i ) i∈Π v 0 and π = τ j , (τ i ) i∈Π \{j } v 0 . As Index j (π) ≤ |α|, we know that Cost j (π) ≤ |α| · c max . It follows that Cost j (π ) < |α| · c max and Index j π < |α| · c max c min ≤ (l − 1) · |V | · K ≤ d (by hypothesis).
The first inequality can be justified as follows. For a contradiction, let us assume that Index j (π ) ≥ |α| · c max c min . It follows that Cost j (π ) ≥ c min · |α| · c max c min , this contradicts the fact that Cost j (π ) < |α| · c max .
As in the proof of Lemma 16, we limit the play π in T to its prefix of length d and get a profitable deviation for player j w.r.t. (σ i ) i∈Π in the game Trunc d (T ), contradicting the fact that (σ i ) i∈Π is a Nash equilibrium in Trunc d (T ).
Moreover, as done in the proof of Lemma 16, (τ 1 , τ 2 ) is a finite-memory strategy profile.
As a consequence of the two previous lemmas, Proposition 13 remains true in this context, we only have to adjust the depth d of the finite tree.
Proposition 29 Let G be a game and T be the unraveling of G. Let Trunc d (T ) be the game played on the truncated tree of T of depth d = max{(|Π| + 1) · (K + 1) · |V |, (|Π| · (K + 1) + 1) · |V | · K}.
If there exists a Nash equilibrium in the game Trunc d (T ), then there exists a finitememory Nash equilibrium in the game T .
Proof The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 13. Let (σ i ) i∈Π be a Nash equilibrium in the game Trunc d (T ) and ρ its outcome. We consider the prefix pq of ρ of minimal length such that
In the worst case, the play ρ visits the goal set of a new player in each prefix of length i · (K + 1) · |V |, 1 ≤ i ≤ |Π|, i.e. |p| = |Π| · (K + 1) · |V |. So we know that l ≤ |Π| · (K + 1) + 1 and pq exists as a prefix of ρ, because the length d of ρ is greater or equal to (|Π| + 1) · (K + 1) · |V | by hypothesis.
Given the length of q (K ≥ 1), one vertex of V is visited at least twice by q. More precisely, we can write
We have Visit(α) = Visit(αβγ ), and |αβγ | = (l + K) · |V |.
Moreover, the following inequality holds:
d ≥ |Π| · (K + 1) + 1 · |V | · K ≥ l · |V | · K and so, l ≤ d |V | · K .
Then, we can apply Lemma 28 and so, we get a finite-memory Nash equilibrium (τ i ) i∈Π in the game T such that Type((τ i ) i∈Π ) = Visit(α).
Thanks to Corollary 12 and Proposition 29, one can easily deduce Theorem 26. Let us comment on the depth d chosen in Proposition 29. It is defined as the maximum between d 1 := (|Π| + 1) · (K + 1) · |V | and d 2 := (|Π| · (K + 1) + 1) · |V | · K. One can easily prove that d 1 < d 2 if and only if K 2 > |Π|+1 |Π| . We now investigate an alternative method to handle simple cost functions. More precisely we only consider cost functions (Cost i ) i∈Π such that for all i, j ∈ Π we have that Cost i = Cost j and Cost i : E → N 0 . In other words, it means that there is a unique non-zero natural cost on every edge. Later on we are going to compare the depths of the finite trees obtained by the two methods.
In the case of these simple cost functions, we can directly deduce Theorem 26 by replacing any edge of cost c by a path of length c composed of c new edges (of cost 1) and then applying the results of Sect. 3 on this new game. If we write G = (Π, V , (V i ) i∈Π , E , (Goal i ) i∈Π ) the new game obtained by adding new vertices and edges when necessary, it holds that:
If we apply Proposition 13, the depth d of the finite tree that is considered satisfies:
Whereas if we apply Proposition 29 directly on the initial game G, we have the following equality:
Let us first notice that if all the edges of G are labeled with the same cost (i.e., c max = c min and K = 1), then
And so, if c max = c min = 1, then d = d = (|Π| + 1) · 2 · |V |, and if c max = c min > 1, then d > d.
When K > 1, the comparison between d and d depends on the values of many parameters of the game. For example, if the graph of the game has five vertices, three edges of cost 1 and one edge of cost 100, then it is more interesting to use the game G and techniques from Sect. 3 to construct the Nash equilibrium, because in this case, d = (Π + 1) · 2 · 104 and d = (|Π| · 101 + 1) · 5 · 101, and so d >> d .
Secure Equilibria
In the previous section, we positively solved Problems 1 and 2 for Nash equilibria. We here solve these two problems for secure equilibria, but in two-player games only. The main results are stated in Theorems 30 and 35 below. In this section, we exclusively consider two-player games.
Theorem 30 In every initialized two-player quantitative reachability game, there exists a finite-memory secure equilibrium.
The proof of Theorem 30 is based on the same ideas as for the proof of Theorem 10 (existence of a Nash equilibrium). Kuhn's theorem (Theorem 11) implies that there exists a secure equilibrium in the game Trunc d (T ) played on the finite tree Trunc d (T ), for any depth d. By choosing an adequate depth d, Proposition 32 enables to extend this secure equilibrium to a secure equilibrium in the infinite tree T , and thus in G.
The notion of secure equilibrium is based on the binary relations 1 and 2 of (1). Since they are clearly preference relations, 8 we get the next corollary by Kuhn's theorem (Theorem 11).
Corollary 31 Let (G, v 0 ) be a two-player quantitative reachability game and T be the unraveling of G from v 0 . Let Trunc d (T ) be the game played on the truncated tree of T of depth d, with d ∈ N. Then there exists a secure equilibrium in Trunc d (T ). Now that we can guarantee the existence of a secure equilibrium in a two-player quantitative reachability game played on a finite tree Trunc d (T ), it remains to show how to lift it to the game played on the infinite tree T . The next proposition states that it is possible to extend a secure equilibrium in Trunc d (T ) to a secure equilibrium in the game T with the same type, if the depth d is greater or equal to (|Π|+1)·2·|V | = 6 · |V | (since we consider two-player games). It also says that we can construct a secure equilibrium in Trunc d (T ) from a secure equilibrium in T , while keeping the same type. where d ≥ 6 · |V |, then there exists a finite-memory secure equilibrium of the same type in the game T .
To prove Proposition 32, we need the following technical lemma whose hypotheses are the same as in Lemma 15. Recall that Lemma 15 states that for all j ∈ Π such that α does not visit Goal j , the players i = j can play together to prevent player j from reaching his goal set Goal j from any history hu consistent with (σ i ) i∈Π \{j } and such that |hu| ≤ |αβ|. We denote by ν −j the memoryless winning strategy of the coalition, and for each player i = j , ν i,j the memoryless strategy of player i in G induced by ν −j .
Lemma 33 Suppose d ∈ N. Let (σ 1 , σ 2 ) be a secure equilibrium in Trunc d (T ) and ρ = σ 1 , σ 2 v 0 its outcome. Assume that ρ has a prefix αβγ , where β contains at least one vertex, such that
|αβ| ≤ l · |V | |αβγ | = (l + 1) · |V | for some l ∈ N 0 . Then we have
In particular, Lemma 33 implies that if α visits none of the goal sets, then ρ visits either both goal sets or none. Notice that in the case of Nash equilibria, we can have situations contradicting Lemma 33, and in particular the previous situation, as it can be seen in Example 17.
Proof Let us suppose that the hypotheses of the lemma are fulfilled, and, by contradiction, we assume that (Visit(α) = ∅ ∨ Visit(ρ) = {1, 2}) ∧ Visit(α) = Visit(ρ). The last conjunct implies that 2 ∈ Visit(ρ) \ Visit(α) or 1 ∈ Visit(ρ) \ Visit(α). We consider the first case (the other one is symmetric). Then, by the first conjunct, we have that 1 ∈ Visit(α) or 1 ∈ Visit(ρ) (otherwise, Visit(α) = ∅ and Visit(ρ) = {1, 2}).
By Lemma 15, player 1 wins the game G 2 from Last(α), that is, has a memoryless winning strategy ν 1,2 from this vertex. Then if player 1 plays according to σ 1 until depth |α|, and then switches to ν 1,2 from Last(α), this strategy is a ≺ 1 -profitable deviation for player 1 w.r.t. (σ 1 , σ 2 ). Indeed, if 1 ∈ Visit(α), player 1 manages to increase player 2's cost while keeping his own cost. On the other hand, if 1 ∈ Visit(ρ), either player 1 succeeds in reaching his goal set (i.e. strictly decreasing his cost), or he does not reach it (then gets the same cost as in ρ) but succeeds in increasing player 2's cost. Thus we get a contradiction.
We can now give the proof of Proposition 32. The idea for showing case (i) is to look at the play π of the secure equilibrium in T and consider the depth d needed to visit all the goal sets of the players in Visit(π ). Then, the secure equilibrium in Trunc d (T ) is defined exactly as the secure equilibrium of T .
The proof of case (ii) works pretty much as the one of Proposition 13 (whereas the latter proposition does not preserve the type of the Nash equilibrium). Thanks to Lemma 33, the proof reduces into only two cases depending on when the goal sets are visited. In the most interesting case, a well-chosen prefix αβ, with β being a cycle, is first extracted from the outcome ρ of the secure equilibrium (σ 1 , σ 2 ) of Trunc d (T ). The outcome of the required secure equilibrium of T will be equal to αβ ω . As soon as a player deviates from this play, the other player punishes him, but the way to define the punishment is here more involved than in the proof of Proposition 13. In the other case, the proof is simpler, but the ideas are quite the same.
Before entering the details, let us introduce a notation. For any play ρ = ρ 0 ρ 1 · · · of G and any player i ∈ Π , we define Index i (ρ) as the least index l such that ρ l ∈ Goal i if it exists, or −1 if not. 9 Moreover, as done in the proof of Lemma 16, (τ 1 , τ 2 ) is a finite-memory strategy profile. Now we consider case (b): Visit(α) = Visit(ρ). Like in the proof of Lemma 16 we consider the infinite play αβ ω in the game T . The basic idea of the strategy profile (τ 1 , τ 2 ) is the same as for the Nash equilibrium case: player 2 (resp. 1) plays according to αβ ω and punishes player 1 (resp. 2) if he deviates from αβ ω , in the following way. Suppose that player 1 deviates (the case for player 2 is similar). Then player 2 plays according to σ 2 until depth |α|, and after that, he plays arbitrarily if α visits Goal 1 , otherwise he plays according to ν 2,1 .
We define the same punishment function P as in the proof of Lemma 16: for v 0 , we define P (v 0 ) = ⊥ and for every history hv such that Last(h) ∈ V i and v ∈ V , we let:
The definition of the secure equilibrium (τ 1 , τ 2 ) is as follows: for h ∈ H such that Last(h) ∈ V i : where i = 1, 2, and arbitrary means that the next vertex is chosen arbitrarily (in a memoryless way). Clearly the outcome of (τ 1 , τ 2 ) is the play αβ ω , and the type of (τ 1 , τ 2 ) is equal to Visit(α) = Visit(ρ), the type of (σ 1 , σ 2 ). Moreover, as done in the proof of Lemma 16, (τ 1 , τ 2 ) is a finite-memory strategy profile.
Remark that the definition of the strategy profile (τ 1 , τ 2 ) is a little different from the one in the proof of Lemma 16 because here, if player 1 deviates (for example), then player 2 has to prevent him from reaching his goal set Goal 1 (faster), or having the same cost but succeeding in increasing player 2's cost.
It remains to show that (τ 1 , τ 2 ) is a secure equilibrium in the game T . Assume by contradiction that there exists a ≺ 1 -profitable deviation τ 1 for player 1 w.r. t. (τ 1 , τ 2 ) . The case of a ≺ 2 -profitable deviation τ 2 for player 2 is similar. We construct a play ρ in Trunc d (T ) as follows: player 1 plays according to the strategy τ 1 restricted to Trunc d (T ) (denoted by σ 1 ) and player 2 plays according to σ 2 . Thus the play ρ coincide with the play π = τ 1 , τ 2 v 0 at least until depth |α| (by definition of τ 2 ); it can differ afterwards. We have: ρ = σ 1 , σ 2 v 0 of cost profile (x 1 , x 2 ) ρ = σ 1 , σ 2 v 0 of cost profile x 1 , x 2 π = τ 1 , τ 2 v 0 of cost profile (y 1 , y 2 ) π = τ 1 , τ 2 v 0 of cost profile y 1 , y 2 . The situation is depicted in Fig. 11 . By contradiction, we assumed that τ 1 is a ≺ 1 -profitable deviation for player 1 w.r.t. (τ 1 , τ 2 ), i.e. (y 1 , y 2 ) ≺ 1 (y 1 , y 2 ). Now we are going to show that (x 1 , x 2 ) ≺ 1 (x 1 , x 2 ), meaning that σ 1 is a ≺ 1 -profitable deviation for player 1 w.r.t. (σ 1 , σ 2 ) in Trunc d (T ). This will lead to the contradiction. As τ 1 is a ≺ 1 -profitable deviation w.r.t. (τ 1 , τ 2 ), one of the following three cases stands.
(1) y 1 < y 1 < +∞.
As π = αβ ω , it means that α visits F 1 , and then:
As y 1 < |α|, we have x 1 = y 1 (as ρ and π coincide until depth |α|). Therefore x 1 < x 1 , and (x 1 , x 2 ) ≺ 1 (x 1 , x 2 ). (2) y 1 < y 1 = +∞.
If y 1 ≤ |α|, we have x 1 = y 1 (by the same argument as before). As Visit(α) = Visit(ρ), we have x 1 = y 1 = +∞ and x 1 < x 1 (and so (x 1 , x 2 ) ≺ 1 (x 1 , x 2 )).
We show that the case y 1 > |α| is impossible. By definition of τ 2 the play π is consistent with σ 2 until depth |α|, and then with ν 2,1 (as y 1 = +∞). By Lemma 15 the play π can not visit Goal 1 after a depth > |α|.
(3) y 1 = y 1 and y 2 < y 2 .
Note that this implies y 2 < +∞ and x 2 = y 2 (as π = αβ ω ). Since ρ and π coincide until depth |α|, y 2 < y 2 and x 2 = y 2 ≤ |α|, we have
showing that the cost of player 2 is increased. In order to ensure that σ 1 is a ≺ 1profitable deviation, it remains to show that either player 1 keeps the same cost, or he decreases his cost.
If y 1 = y 1 < +∞, it follows as in the first case that: y 1 = x 1 ≤ |α| and x 1 = y 1 .
Therefore x 1 = x 1 , i.e. player 1 has the same cost in ρ and ρ . And so, (x 1 , x 2 ) ≺ 1 (x 1 , x 2 ). On the contrary, if y 1 = y 1 = +∞, it follows that x 1 = +∞ (as Visit(α) = Visit(ρ)). And so, we have that x 1 < +∞ = x 1 , or x 1 = x 1 . But in both cases, it holds that (x 1 , x 2 ) ≺ 1 (x 1 , x 2 ).
In conclusion, we constructed a ≺ 1 -profitable deviation σ 1 w.r.t. (σ 1 , σ 2 ) in Trunc d (T ), and then we get a contradiction.
Remark 34 Let us notice that in case (i) of Proposition 32, the proof remains valid if we take d = max{0, Index 1 (π), Index 2 (π)}. Thus, in the statement of case (i), the constraint d ≥ 6 · |V | can be replaced by d ≥ 0.
We can now proceed to the proof of Theorem 30.
Proof of Theorem 30 Let us set d := 6 · |V | and apply Corollary 31 on the finite game Trunc d (T ). Then we get a secure equilibrium in this game. By Proposition 32 there exists in (G, v 0 ) a finite-memory secure equilibrium with the same type.
Theorem 30 positively answers to Problem 1 for secure equilibria in two-player games. The next theorem solves Problem 2 for the same kind of games.
Theorem 35 Given a secure equilibrium in an initialized two-player quantitative reachability game, there exists a finite-memory secure equilibrium of the same type.
Proof Let (G, v 0 ) be a two-player quantitative reachability game, and let (σ 1 , σ 2 ) be a secure equilibrium in (G, v 0 ). By the first part of Proposition 32, there exists a secure equilibrium of the same type in the game Trunc d (T ), for a certain depth d ≥ 6 · |V |. If we apply the second part of Proposition 32, we get a finite-memory secure equilibrium of the same type as (σ 1 , σ 2 ) in (G, v 0 ).
The proof of Theorem 35 is based on Proposition 32 which, roughly speaking, ensures that every secure equilibrium of Trunc d (T ) can be lifted to a secure equilibrium of the same type in T , and conversely. Notice that Proposition 32 has no counterpart for Nash equilibria, since we can not guarantee that the type can be preserved, as it can be seen from Example 17. This approach makes the proof of Theorem 35 rather different than the proof of Theorem 18.
Notice that Proposition 32 stands for two-player games because its proof uses Lemma 33 that has been proved only for two players.
Conclusion and Perspectives
In this paper, we first prove the existence of finite-memory Nash equilibria for multiplayer quantitative reachability games played on finite graphs. We also prove that this result remains true when the model is enriched by allowing n-tuples of positive costs on edges (one cost by player), answering a question we posed in [4] . Moreover we extend our existence result to quantitative games where both safety and reachability objectives coexist. Secondly, we prove the existence of finite-memory secure equilibria for two-player quantitative reachability games played on finite graphs.
There are several interesting directions for further research. First, we intend to investigate the existence of secure equilibria in the n-player framework. Notice that the proof techniques related to our results on secure equilibria rely on the two-player assumption. Furthermore, we also want to investigate deeper the size of the memory needed in the equilibria. This could be a first step towards a study of the complexity of computing equilibria with certain requirements, in the spirit of [11] . We would also like to address these questions for other quantitative objectives, inspired from Büchi or request-response objectives, for instance.
Note that the existence of subgame perfect equilibria in multiplayer quantitative reachability games has been proved in [5] .
